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Abstract— This paper analyzes the impact of 
guaranteed minimum price contracts between sub-
groups of farmers and a fair trade manufacturer on the 
spot market price. We focus on the fair trade concept in 
the coffee supply chain as an example. We analyze a 
three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive 
farmers upstream who offer their raw product to 
manufacturers who then sell finished products to a 
downstream retailer. Without fair trade, all the raw 
product is sold on the spot market. When a sub-group of 
farmers benefit from a guaranteed minimum price 
contract offered by a fair trade certifier, we show that 
farmers outside of this fair trade agreement may also 
benefit from a higher spot market price in cases of a 
limited overproduction. 
Keywords— Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts, 
Fair Trade, Vertical Chain. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Fair Trade is usually defined as an alternative to the 
traditional trade [1][2]. Its purpose is to fight against 
poverty setting a trade channel enabling small 
producers from the South to have access to markets of 
the northern countries. The growth of Fair Trade 
products is based both on the small producers’ specific 
skills but also on northern countries’ consumers who 
are sensitive to this initiative. The label (FLO) is 
acknowledged at an international level and gather 
manufacturers who offer a guaranteed minimum price 
contract to small farmers. Today, most of the farmers 
involved in the Fair Trade market sells only a small 
part of their production through the Fair Trade 
channel, around 20% [3]; the rest is sold on the 
traditional market at the spot market price.  
However, Bowen (2001) [4] notes that: “Most 
producers only sell a small part of their total 
production to the Fair Trade market. The rest is sold 
under the usual conditions to the mainstream market. 
However, by paying a fair price for even a small part 
of production, there is often a snowball effect on 
prices paid for the rest of production. As Alternative 
Trading Organizations buy up part of production at a 
higher price, this reduces the availability of products 
to middlemen who are then forced to offer higher 
prices to obtain sufficient quantities. This effect has 
been experienced in the case of honey sales in Chiapas 
in Mexico, Brazil nuts in Peru, cocoa in Bolivia, tea in 
Zimbabwe etc. This means that not only is it possible 
for producers who are lucky enough to have made 
contact with Fair Trade outlets to sell all their 
production at better prices, but other producers in the 
region, often equally marginalized, benefit also.” ([4], 
p.31). This paragraph of the European Fair Trade 
Association yearbook perfectly exposes the main 
insight of this article. Indeed, we bring here theoretical 
grounds to the idea that Fair Trade may not only 
benefit to the farmers involved in the fair trade but 
also to other farmers thanks to a positive indirect 
effect on the spot market price.  
This report was not clearly established in the coffee 
market case, where chronical overproduction exists. 
Spot market prices for coffee are regularly decreasing 
at the New-York stock exchange since the suppression 
of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) 
agreements on export quotas, excepted in 1994 and in 
1997 when the harvest were unusually low because of 
the frost on Brazilian crops. In particular, between 
December 2000 and May 2004, the monthly averages 
of ICO indicator prices for a Colombian mild arabica 
varied from 58,10 to 78,25 US cents per lb, whereas 
costs of production were estimated between 60 and 80 
US cents per lb (source: Web site of the ICO). Beside, 
there is a strong unbalance of power between a large 
number of small farmers and a few large roasters. Five 
biggest roasters of the market buy almost half of the 
green coffee beans world production: Kraft (13%), 
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Nestlé (13%), Sara Lee (10%), Procter&Gamble (4%), 
Tchibo (4%) [5].  
The balance of power being unfavorable to small 
farmers, Fair Trade clearly appears as an insurance 
against the risk of overproduction threatening their 
revenue. Guaranteed minimum price contracts 
(henceforth denoted GMP) thus sustain the price level 
for small farmers of a Fair Trade association, but by 
diverting part of the production from the traditional 
market, this insurance may also have side effects on 
the equilibrium spot market. The goal of this article is 
to identify conditions such that GMP contracts offered 
to a group of farmers increase the spot market price.  
Several articles of industrial organization theory 
study the influence of contracts between sub-groups of 
producers and retailers on the spot market price. These 
articles usually differ according to the type of contract 
considered or to the market structure at each level. In 
general, as these contracts affect both the offer and the 
demand, their effect on the spot market price is 
ambiguous. Xia and Sexton (2004) [6] focus on the 
cattle market and show that Top-Of-the-Market-
Pricing (TOMP) contracts between cattle sellers and 
packers may refrain buyers from competing 
aggressively. TOMP clauses specify that a cattle 
producer will deliver a given quantity to the buyer at a 
base price set at the highest spot market price paid for 
cattle during a comparison period. In their paper 
sellers are price-takers while buyers are competing 
imperfectly and behave strategically. However, buyers 
have no market power on the final market and sell at a 
given price. In their model, a group of sellers accepts 
the TOMP contracts from buyers and these clauses 
enables buyers to commit not to competing too 
aggressively with each other which relaxes 
competition, reduces quantities and finally lowers the 
spot market price.  
We focus on the coffee market, a key product for 
Fair Trade and analyze the effect of the development 
of a Fair Trade channel who offers a GMP contract to 
part of the farmers. The coffee industry is more 
complex than the vertical industry analyzed by [6]We 
distinguish three main actors: Perfectly competitive 
farmers of green coffee at the upstream level, an 
oligopoly of roasters who transform and produce the 
finish coffee at the intermediary level, and a 
downstream monopsonist retailer who sells coffee to 
consumers.  
This article first determines, as a benchmark, the 
spot market price among roasters and green coffee 
farmers taking into account the strategic interactions 
among the three levels of the channel. We then 
introduce a Fair Trade channel who offers small 
upstream farmers a GMP clause as an insurance in the 
bad state of nature, i.e, in case of overproduction. We 
then study the effects of the introduction of this 
channel on the spot market price. In our paper, the 
introduction of a Fair Trade channel is both a GMP 
clause offered to farmers and a disintermediation 
process, as the green coffee is no more transformed by 
the powerful roasters but by non strategic roasters 
acknowledged by the Fair Trade label. In this 
framework, our article shows that the introduction of a 
Fair Trade channel may raise the spot market price. 
This result confirms the report of Fair Trade 
Organizations [4] thus showing that small farmers not 
directly involved in Fair Trade may also benefit from 
it. 
II. THE MODEL 
A. The Market Structure 
We analyse a three level vertical chain gathering 
farmers, manufacturers and a retailer. At the upstream 
level, farmers are perfectly competitive and offer their 
raw product to manufacturers. We normalize their 
production cost to zero. In the processing industry, 
manufacturers constitutes an oligopoly of size (n ) 
and they sell their finished product to a downstream 
monopsonist retailer who sells the goods to 
consumers. Their cost is limited to their supply in 
input in the spot market, all other production costs 
being normalized to zero. We consider that the retailer 
is a monopsonist in order to reflect the high 
concentration in the retail sector. Again retail cost are 
normalized to zero.
1 When there is a Fair Trade 
channel, the retailer can sell the Fair Trade product, as 
well as the   national brands, if it is profitable for her.  
1 ≥
n
                                                           
1A recent paper analyzed a similar vertical industry framework [7]. 
They mention that empirically, this framework is consistent with 
available studies of market structure in the food industry both in 
Europe and US. 
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C. The Game  This framework aims at stylising the main 
characteristics of the coffee industry. Upstream 
farmers are then coffee green beans producers, 
manufacturers who hold the national brands are those 
who transform beans into ready-to-drink beverage for 
consumers (in general roast, instant or decaffeinated 
coffee). An oligopoly is also a good representation of 
manufacturers in the coffee processing industry. 
We analyse successively two cases absent and with 
the Fair Trade channel. Without Fair Trade channel 
the game is the following:  
•  Stage 1: Farmers incur their production cost 
(normalized to zero) and then the level of the harvest 
is revealed:   
2 [0 ] v RU , → .  
•  Stage 2: Offer and demand determine the spot 
market price for raw products  .   c B. The Demand 
•  Stage 3: The   brand manufacturers set their 
wholesale price  , with k , maximizing their 
profit.  
n
k w [1 ] ∈ ,...,
The consumers may differ in their product 
preferences. 
2 Given the n  brands offered in the 
market, we assume that the representative consumer 
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,  (1) 
•  Stage 4: The retailer accepts or refuses each 
manufacturer’s contract and sets her price  k p for each 
selected brand k on the final market.  
where   is a measure of the market size and q  is 
the quantity of product i sold by the retailer. The 
parameter 
0 v > i
[0 1] β ∈,  is a measure for product 
differentiation: The higher β , the closer the products 
are substitutes. This formulation due to Shubik-
Levitan (1980) [9] ensures that the parameter β  only 
captures product differentiation and has no effect on 
the market size.
3  
We assume that manufacturers and retailer have no 
cost of production and retailing. 
We then analyse the case where there is a Fair 
Trade product proposed by a fair trade organization. 
This Fair Trade product is carried by the retailer in 
addition to the previous n  coffee brands.
4  
The "Fair Trade game" is identical to the previous 
game except that we add the following stage "0":  
•  Stage 0: The Fair Trade certifier sets his price 
contract P.   Let  k p  be the price charged by the retailer for the 
product  . Solving   for k , we 
obtain the following inverse and direct demand 
function:  



















We assume the Fair Trade certifier chooses a 
guaranteed minimum price G that maximizes the 
revenue of the farmers involved in the Fair Trade and 
that he can not offer a price inferior to the spot market 
price.
5 Indeed, the Fair Trade wholesale price is 

























                                                          
 (3) 
max( )
f PG =, c
                                                          
 (4) 
where   is the spot market price when there is a 
Fair Trade channel and G  is the GMP. We solve the 
two games in the next section.  
f c
 
4 The alternative would be to assume that the Fair Trade product 
must replace one of the previous n coffee brands sold by the 
retailer. However, this boils down to assume that the retailer has a 
capacity constraint which would dramatically change the balance 
of power in favor of the retailer: The latter being able to threaten 
credibly each manufacturer of exclusion, wholesale prices would 
be driven to the marginal cost of production and the manufacturers 
would get zero profits. 
 
2We do not introduce any specific difference between consumers’ 
preferences about the possible Fair Trade characteristic of the 
product. See [8] for an analysis of this question. 
5More details on the certifier objectives are developed in 
subsection 3.2. 
3See [10] for details. 
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A. Equilibrium absent Fair Trade  •  Equilibrium wholesale and final prices are 
respectively   and  2 k wvR =− k p vR =− .   The monopsonist multiproduct retailer chooses her 
final prices  k p  for the k  brand products 
maximizing her profit function:  
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•  Equilibrium retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits 
are respectively 
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Replacing (5) in (3), we obtain the quantity 
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k  for the   
brand product. For any symmetric wholesales prices, 
the retailer’s profit is independent of  , and thus we 
therefore assume that the retailer chooses to carry all 
the products in her shelves.  
The equilibrium spot market price increases with 
the potential demand, the number of manufacturers 
and the degree of substitutability among brands. 
Indeed, a higher number of manufacturers or a 
stronger substitutability between products leads up to a 
stronger competition on the intermediate market which 
balances the market power between farmers and 
manufacturers and thus improves the revenues of 
small farmers.  
Manufacturers set their wholesale price   in order 
to maximize their profit:  
k w
() 1 ( kk k n wc q w … w π =− , , (7) 
where   is the price of raw products on the spot 
market. We obtain:  
c
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We are thus able to determine the total demand on 












.  (9) 









v , the value of   when the harvest is at 




v R = ). Note that   is negative for 




R , farmers have a strictly positive expected 
profit ( () 0 cR
∗ > ). By contrast, the equilibrium 
wholesale price is always positive as  2
v R<  since 
manufacturers chooses to produce after the level of the 
harvest is revealed. Note that the level of yield which 
maximizes the total profit of the supply chain 
upstream level (cR ) is  k n π
∗ + 4
v = R , the average 
harvest. From now on, we define the overproduction 
as a situation where the harvest is higher than this 
level R .  
2. Equilibrium with Fair Trade 
 
The superscript “ f ” is used to denote the 
equilibrium outcomes in the Fair Trade case. Let 
f p  
denote the price of the Fair Trade product and 
f
k p  the 
price of the brand coffee k  in the final market.  
From stage 1, the level of the harvest is R  and thus 
offer and demand determine the spot market price for 
raw products. The equilibrium without Fair Trade is 
summarized in the following lemma:  
 
The global quantity bought by consumers is:   Lemma 1.  On a market without a Fair Trade 
channel,  
•  The equilibrium spot market price for raw 
products is:  
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k  the quantity sold by the brand   when there is a Fair 












If  () f c c < P
n
, the spot market price for raw product 
and the retail prices of products k  are so low 
relatively to the Fair Trade price   that the retailer 
does not sell the Fair Trade product and the wholesale 
price is the one derived from the benchmark model. If 
1… =, ,
P
() () f Pc P c c <<
()
f qP c ,
k ,
6 all products are sold which is the 
interesting case for our purpose.   
f c
2(n ≤−
Demand on the input market may arise both from 
brand manufacturers,   and from the Fair Trade 
channel  . The level of the harvest is 
k nq
R , so 
that supply and demand determine the spot market 
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Lemma 2. On a market with a Fair Trade channel, 
the sub-game equilibrium spot market price for raw 
products   depends on the Fair Trade price  .   P
1. If Pv 1 ) nR β +− , the retailer sells only 
the Fair Trade product and 
()
2 ()
Rv P DfD P ππ
− => .  In the last stage, the retailer maximizes her profit by 
choosing the retail prices of all products. Her 
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2. If vn 2( 1 ) 2 n R P v R β β −+ − < < − , the retailer 
sells all the products,  
2 (1 ) (2 )( 2 (1 ) ) 2 (1 ) ( 2 )
(1 ) ()
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The solution is:  






p Pp w k
+ +
== ∀ … n = , , .  (13) 3.  If  2 Pv R β ≥−
f
, the retailer sells only the   





Df PR π =
   
The retailer is free to list the Fair Trade product or 
not. She thus compares profits obtained in the two 
cases and carries the Fair Trade product only if:  
Df π π ≥
D .  (14) 
It is clear that the equilibrium spot market price 
when it exists is decreasing with the level of the 
harvest R .  
 
  Proposition 1. When the Fair Trade product is sold 
in addition to the n brand products, the spot market 
price,  , decreases with the level of the GMP on 




Replacing (13) into the individual quantities above, 
the   brand manufacturers set their wholesale price 
maximizing their individual profit and considering the 
level of Fair Trade price   as given: 
n
P
1 max ( ) ( )
f
k
ff f f f
kk k n
w
wc q w … w P π =− , , ,  (15) 
 
In stage 2, the equilibrium condition between 
demand and supply is given by the following equation:    
We thus obtain:  
() i f ( )
(1 )( 1) ( 1 )
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(
(16)  When the Fair Trade price,  , is higher, the final 
Fair Trade price,  () p P , increases. Thus, quantities 
of Fair Trade product sold in the final market are 
lower. The first outcome is that the demand on the 
                                                           
6With  
and   . 
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intermediate market for brand products ()  
increases. The second effect is that, for the same total 




f ) R q −  also increases. But the supply effect is 
higher than the demand effect. Indeed, 
()0
f








f qP c ∂,
∂ −> > . Thus the equilibrium spot 
market price decreases.  
f
ff
P RqcP n −, |
R
∗
( G R ,
Df D ππ
lim RR
To guarantee a minimum revenue to farmers 
involved in Fair Trade channel, the Fair Trade certifier 




v R = , the worst case of over-production. In 
that case, let define G 2 (1 )v β
∗ =−  as the GMP binding 




 and the equilibrium 
guaranteed minimum price   such that  
We define   which is uniquely defined by the 
following equality
7  
00 0 () f
ff
k c qcP
= =, |  (18) 
P c =
It will be used as a benchmark in the next section.  
Let now turn to the Stage 0 where the Fair Trade 




. The Fair Trade certifier may have 
different objectives.
8 We assume here that G  
maximizes the farmers’ expected profits, 
f Gq  
under the retailer’s participation constraint:
9  
)
  2 Gv R β ≥⇔ ≤ − .  (19) 
12 ( GM i n G G






In summary, as the Fair Trade price can not be 
lower than the spot market price, we obtain the 
equilibrium Fair Trade price:  
0 (
f PM a x G c
∗ ∗ =,  (21) 
The spot market price c  is increasing in the 
potential demand, the degree of substitutability among 
brands, as in the benchmark case, but it is decreasing 
in the number of manufacturers.  
0
f
When the Fair Trade harvest is not paid at the same 
price than on the spot market, that is, when  , 






As already mentioned, the Fair Trade certifier does 
not know the level of the harvest when he sets the 
GMP. We first assume that the condition (19) is true at 
the average harvest R . In this case, the Fair Trade 
certifier program is the following:  
12 (
ff cM a x c c
∗ =,  (22) 























β − ∗ = .   
However, as we have assumed that the condition 
(19) had to be true at the average harvest R , if R is 
such that Gv 1 2 R β
∗ >−  
(





+ >= , < >  and 
the retailer does not sell the Fair Trade product.  
) 3
                                                          
As in the benchmark case, the spot market price 
 is decreasing in 
f c
∗ R  and   and c  decrease in  1
f c 2
f
R  with the same slope. More,   increases in  2
f c β  
faster than  , with   when  1
f c 2 c 1
f f c > 2
3 β > . The effect 
of the degree of substitutability checked in the 
benchmark case is heightened. In addition, we can 




n R R <  and increasing with   
otherwise.
11 When the harvest is relatively low, a 
stronger competition at the intermediate level of the 
chain does not improve the revenues of farmers, 
because the spot market price is already high.  
n
It is possible to study the overproduction threshold, 
max R , as we define it in the benchmark case (see 
Appendix 1 for details). We obtain that when products 
() (
ff
k qc P n qc P ,+ ,
 
)
                                                           
7Note that   is unique as   strictly 




8See [8] for a discussion about the Fair Trade certifier’s objectives. 
9We assume that if the retailer is indifferent between selling or not 
the Fair Trade product, she chooses to sell it. 
10Where   and 
 
22 2 ( 4 (1 )2 )8 (1 ) ( 2 )
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11The exact value of R  is available in Appendix 2.  n
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are weakly substitutes, the area of overproduction is 
limited in relation to the benchmark case. The 
situation is opposite with close substitute products.  
•  When R  is low  0 () R R < ,
12  .   0
f Pc
∗ =
In that case, farmers have the same revenue either 
inside the Fair Trade channel or on the spot market; all 
farmers sell at the same spot market price  . Absent 
the Fair Trade channel, farmers sell their production at 
the spot market price  . Comparing the equilibrium 
spot market price in both situations, we obtain the 





IV. IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 
FAIR TRADE CHANNEL 
We here compare results obtained when there is a 
Fair Trade channel with the ones of the benchmark 
model, in terms of spot market price and profits.    
Lemma 3.  We show that cc .   0
f ∗ >
A.  Spot market price   
Proof. See Appendix 3.     Figure 1 represents equilibrium spot market prices 
with and absent Fair Trade in the map () R c , . The 
black line in this figure depicts the spot market price 




R . The red curve shows the spot market price 
in a market where there is a Fair Trade channel  , 
which is equal to   when 
f c
0
f c 0 R R <  and c  
otherwise. The dashed curve represents the Fair Trade 
price  , the wholesale price paid to producers 







  0 =
 
 
We thus obtain the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2.  When R is low, revenue of all 
farmers are increased by the introduction of a Fair 
Trade channel. The benefit is the same for Fair Trade 
farmers and outsiders.  
 
This result is due to the fact that there is no 
intermediary for the Fair Trade product. The insight is 
as follows: With Fair Trade, total demand, that is, the 
sum of the demand on the spot market and the demand 
within the Fair Trade channel, is strictly higher than 
the demand absent the Fair Trade channel. Indeed, the 
wholesale price paid by the retailer for the Fair Trade 
product   is lower than the wholesale price 
paid to manufacturers,  . Thus, the final price of the 






f p , is lower than the final price 
of each brand product, 
f
k p  which increases the total 
demand with the Fair Trade channel. Note that this 
“no intermediary” effect would also appear if the Fair 
Trade product was replacing one of the n  brands in 
the retailer’s shelves; this result is not due to the fact 

















with     1,    6, .7 vnβ ==
cf*
Fig. 1 Spot market prices and Fair Trade price 
•  If R  is high ( 0 R R ≥ ),  .   PG
∗∗ =
Let first consider the case where R is low and 







In that case the spot market price when there is a 
Fair Trade channel is   and farmers inside the Fair 
Trade channel obtain a revenue that is strictly higher 
f c
∗
                                                           
12The exact value of   is available in Appendix 2.  0 R
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than those who sell on the spot market. Absent the Fair 
Trade, all the farmers sell the raw product at the spot 
market price  . Both c  and   strictly decrease in  c
∗ f ∗ c
∗















R q cG n q cG




⇔= , + , = ,
∗
 (23) 
If the supply R  is greater than R∗
G
∗
, the demand in a 
market without a parallel channel,   (Equation 
(9)), is higher than the total demand in a market with 
this parallel channel,  ; thus, the spot 
market price is higher in the first kind of market. 
Figure 2 depicts the total demand functions in the 
 map. The red line is the total demand function 
when there is a Fair Trade channel and the green line 







Lemma 4.  There exists a threshold R
∗  such that:
13 
 if  cc
∗∗ ≥ R
∗  and   if  cc < R R >
∗ .  
 
Proof. See Appendix 4.    
)
 
Proposition 3. If overproduction is rather limited 
( R
∗ < ) the introduction of a Fair Trade channel 
increases the equilibrium spot market price paid to 
farmers outside the Fair Trade.  
with     1,     6,   0.7 vnβ ===
 
 
The Fair Trade farmers always have a greater 
benefit from the introduction of the Fair Trade channel 
than outsiders.  
Nonetheless farmers associated to the Fair Trade 
benefit form a greater revenue but also all farmers 
outside of the Fair Trade channel have a greater 
revenue. This result perfectly sustains the observation 
of Bowen on "the snowball effect" of Fair Trade that 
we have described in introduction. The existence of a 
parallel channel in a supply chain benefits all 
producers in terms of price when the harvest is not too 
high.  
We can note that when the differentiation 
parameter,   tends towards 1,  i  tends towards  2
v . 
Thus, when all brands and products are highly 
substitutable, the spot market price is always greater 
when there is a Fair Trade channel.  
Fig. 2 Total demand functions 
When the Fair Trade farmers are paid the GMP, 
, there are two different prices for the raw product, 
, related to the two specific demands, the 
spot market demand, nq , and the Fair Trade 
channel demand,  . The latter is increasing 
in  ; the cross price elasticity of the demand is 
positive. And finally, the total demand function, 




















Note also that the threshold   is higher than the 
overproduction threshold 
max R . This means that the 
Fair Trade channel is harmful for farmers not involved 
in this parallel channel only when there is a heavy 
overproduction.  
To explain these results, we detail the demand and 
supply of raw product, which determine the spot 
market price. In the model with a parallel channel, 
when  , that is,  G
∗ > 0 R ≥ , in the Stage 2 of the 
game, we can rewrite the Equation (17) as  
() ( )
ff D cG D c
cc
∗ ∂, ∂
∂ < ∂  with  () ( )
ff
Gc Dc Dc G ∗
∗
= =, | , more 
() ( )
f D cG Dc
c
∗ ∂, ∂
∂ < c ∂  (see Figure 2). This is the negative 
“demand sensitivity” effect : the slope of the total                                                             
13The exact value of   is available in Appendix 2.  R
∗
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For the manufacturers, we can show that when their 
individual profit is higher with Fair Trade than without 
when the harvest is higher than a threshold 
k R .
16 This 
is due to the fact that c  and that the equilibrium 
quantities of brand products is increasing in 
f
∗ ∗ < c
R  when 
0 R R > . Even if there is an extra product, the 
manufacturers can benefit of the parallel channel 
through the GMP effect and the demand sensitive 
effect.  
demand function   in Figure 2. For a given 














                            
)
There is a second new effect we called the “GMP” 











: the level 
of the total demand function   in Figure 2. 





the Fair Trade final price is higher than the brand final 
price because the Fair Trade wholesale price   is 
much higher than the spot market price, c , and than 
each wholesale price of the brand product. This 
induces a decrease of the total demand.  
f ∗
To compare the situation of small producers, we 
need to compare prices as done previously but also 
quantities sold. Figure 3 represents the market share of 
the Fair Trade product relatively to other products. 
The quantities sold of Fair Trade product are maximal 
when the spot market price c  is equal to the 





0 R R = .  
And finally, the positive effect of the lack of 
intermediary in the parallel channel is counterbalanced 
by this negative GMP effect and by the negative 
demand sensitivity effect.  
We can define the minimum GMP, G , defined as   min
∗
min min () (
f Dc D c











such that whatever the level of harvest, the spot 
market price with a parallel channel is higher than the 
spot market price without a parallel channel. Thus, the 
“demand sensitive effect” can be cancelled by the 
choice of a low GMP.  
B. Profits 
Concerning the profits, the retailer’s profit is always 
greater in a market with one Fair Trade product than 
without. This is due to the fact that the Fair Trade 
certifier observes the condition (19) when he sets the 
GMP. In fact, absent Fair Trade, the retailer’s margin 
is equal to R . With Fair Trade, when R Bv < , the 
retailer’s margin on brand products is lower then R , 
but her margin on Fair Trade product is higher than 
R . The inequalities are opposite when R Bv > .  
Fig. 3 Quantities 
We now compare the total profits of all farmers 
with Fair Trade and the farmers’ profits absent Fair 
Trade.  
 
Proposition 4. Upstream farmers’ total profits are 
higher when there exists a parallel channel with a 
                                
14Nevertheless, this effect can be view as a good thing for farmers 
not involved in the parallel channel, because the spot market price 
is less sensitive to variations of the harvest.                                                             
15See Appendix 2 for the exact value of  .  B 16The exact value of   is available in Appendix 2. 
k R
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GMP than in a market without a parallel channel if 
the harvest is not too high (
f R R < ).
17  
Our results can be generalized to all supply chains 
where there exists a specific channel which offers a 
contract to some producers with a guaranteed 





∗ > , we can say that the existence of a 
specific channel in a supply chain benefits all farmers 
when the overproduction is not calamitous. This is all 
the more true as the different brand products and the 
Fair Trade product are highly substitutable.  
VI. APPENDIXES  
A. Overproduction 









if ( ) 2
when i e
















 <<  =, . . ,< , = 
>>  
=, . . ,≥ , = <
  This article is a theoretical contribution to a 
question surrounding the existence of a Fair Trade 
channel in the supply chain of a good. A general 
critics against Fair Trade is that only a few may 
benefit from a better situation and it is likely that it 
will be to the detriment of other small producers who 
are excluded from this channel. Some Fair Trade 
organizations claim that by paying a higher price for a 
part of the harvest, there is a snowball effect on spot 
market price paid for the rest of the production in the 
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(2 (1 ) 2 ) max






+− =  
and  () 2 n β <  when  5 19 0 641101 β <− =. .  
B. Harvest thresholds 
Let  ()
2
82 BM a x
ββ + =, .  
We have first shown that when there is not a too 
large overproduction, producers not involved in the 
Fair Trade concept obtain a higher spot market price 
for their harvest than in the case where there is no Fair 
Trade channel. This conclusion clearly supports the 
argument underlined by Fair Trade organizations. This 
is due to the fact that there is no intermediary in the 
Fair Trade channel.  
2
8 B
β + =  when  2
3 β <  and  2 B
β =  when  2
3 β ≥ .  
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•  Let  0 R  such that     00 ()
f Gc R
∗ = However, for strong overproduction, Fair Trade 
may have a negative indirect effect by lowering the 
spot market price paid to farmers not involved in the 
Fair Trade channel. This is due to the GMP and that 
the total final demand is less sensitive to the spot 
market price, because there are two wholesale prices 
for the raw product, the spot market price.  
0
(2)









<   
•  Let R
∗  such that     () ()
f cR c R
∗∗ ∗ ∗ =
22
(2( 1) )( )








+− + − −
,   
Besides, we have shown that if the wholesale price 
of the Fair Trade product is higher, that is, if the Fair 
Trade certifier sets a higher GMP, the spot market 
price decreases. More, the certifier could choose a low 
GMP in order to favour all farmers by eliminating the 
GMP effect on the total demand.  
•  In the model with one Fair Trade product, the 
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00 (2)
2( 1 )
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nR f
k n f























k R  such that  () ()
fk k
kk R R ππ
∗ =   
                                                           
(1 ) ( ) ( 1 )(1 ) ( )
k n
R Bv Bv
nn n n n n
β
ββ β β β
−
=>
+− − − − +− −
.
17The exact value of   is available in Appendix 2. 
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